





[AUTHOR BIO:  
Nick Couldry is Professor of Media, Communications and Social Theory at the London 
school of Economics and Political Science. His interests include media power, voice, 
media ethics, media’s contribution to democracy, and the social consequences of 
datafication and surveillance.  
Correspondence to Nick Couldry, Department of Media and  
Communications, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, 
UK: email: n.couldry@lse.ac.uk] 
 
No one disputes that the collection of ‘Big Data’ holds the promise of interesting, even 
radically new, discoveries. But any critical social science of Big Data must take account of 
the broad transformations in communication and social organization that have generated the 
situation where Big Data is standardly available not just to corporations and states, but to 
researchers too. What if those transformations are potentially inimical, at some deeper level, 
to the very goals (for example, the sustaining of democratic politics) that may motivate much 
of our research in the first place? This short article seeks to raise some pertinent questions 
along these lines. 
 
Political communications research that is serious about engaging with the challenge of Big 
Data must address the epochal shift in the political and social order that underlies the 
emergence of Big Data.  There has been a progressive shift over the past 30 years in our 
infrastructures of communication which is changing fundamentally the nature of institutional 
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power. We are in the early stages of a large-scale attempt to reshape the very possibilities of 
social order so as to expand the scope of market functioning and commercial exploitation. I 
am referring not just to the fact of today’s internet, and the many layers through which we 
connect or are connected (social media, apps, the data harvest of the ‘internet of things’), but 
also to the shifts in value associated with these facts: emerging norms of connectivity, the 
emerging hope that human life can become increasingly governed through the data our 
connections generate, and the emerging assumption that the route to economic value and 
better lives lies through more connectedness, because that means more data. Changes in the 
starting-points for research are themselves only by products of these broader transformations, 
not drivers of them. 
 
The shift towards permanent connectedness can be viewed from many directions. Some see it 
as a new phase of capitalism, what Shoshana Zuboff of Harvard Business School calls 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (2015). For Zuboff, surveillance capitalism involves a distinctive 
emphasis on data extraction rather than the production of new goods or institutions;,the 
intense concentration of power over such extraction in a small set of non-labour-intensive 
corporations, such as Google, and the data sectors they dominate; and most relevantly here, 
the negative implications of this transformation for values such as freedom. Connection itself 
is not the problem – indeed it may be an enhancement of what humans can do together – but 
it is what comes with connection, in particular its infrastructure of surveillance, that 
comprises the Faustian bargain, whose terms we urgently need to evaluate.  
 
 In this short article, I want to argue, in at least preliminary terms, that this infrastructure of 
surveillance is in tension at some level not just with freedom in a general sense, but with the 




The New Infrastructure of Connection 
 
In the past three centuries, the infrastructure of communication required for economic and 
social expansion remained closely linked to the spaces that were governable by nation-states, 
and broadly compatible with the normative principles on which the various practical versions 
of democracy were based. In the past four decades globalized connection generated various 
processes that challenged the boundaries of nation-state governance, but again not necessarily 
the freedoms which democracy usually is considered to involve.  
 
In the current era, however the balance may be different. The key is the emergence, over 60 
years, of today’s internet. The internet’s history has often been told as an expansion of a 
‘technology of freedom’ (de Sola Pool 1983), and certainly, it is a very major development 
which changes irrevocably the scale on which human beings are in touch with each other: on 
the face of it, this contributes to all manner of specific human needs.  But it is too simple to 
see the internet as a technology of freedom, since its basis is not freedom, but connection: the 
potential connectedness of all packets of information, and all sites from which we access the 
internet and all actors in that space. In the past 10 years, our modes of access have multiplied, 
until today we discuss embedding automated connection into domestic objects (the ‘internet 
of things’). This deepening of connection (the requirement to be connected) brings into focus 
a two-way bargain: if every point in space-time is connectable to every other, then, by the 
same token, it is susceptible to monitoring from every other. 
 
Understanding the social and political consequences of constant connection involves a 
number of steps. First, we must notice the profound shift in the organization of human life 
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that flows from the normalization of continuous access to the internet for social actors – of 
course, the norm is for many millions of people not realised, but even the assumption of it has 
enormous consequences. The idea of a many-to-many communications space was already 
inherent in the small networks set up between computers in the 1960s, but then it benefited 
only elite communicators. Diffusing networked transmission and reception across large 
percentages of the population, through the commercialization of the internet in the mid 
1990s, changed the basic resources of everyday social action.  From the mid 2000s new types 
of interaction space (social media) made possible ‘mass self-communication’ (Castells 2009), 
unimaginable a decade before. Wherever we are, we can act on, and be acted on from, 
multiple distances and directions, and in multiple modalities.   
 
It follows from this, second, that social space-time has become open to saturation by 
corporate action, directed at the making of profit (by corporations) and the regulation, or 
modification, of action (by governments). As Joseph Turow writes, ‘the centrality of 
corporate power is a direct reality at the very heart of the digital age’ (Turow 2011: 17).  
 
Third, all who aim to communicate beyond a small set of defined interlocutors face a deep 
challenge which drives them to use this new institutional potential for acting on ‘the social’. 
The challenge derives directly from increased connection. Actors of all kinds now have 
hugely increased capacities to send messages in all directions, which they often exercise. The 
volume of messages in circulation has therefore increased exponentially, creating: the need to 
filter out most messages; and the need for tools to search for particular contents (through 
search engines and apps). Each person comes, increasingly, to engage with the world through 
a system-based filtering, which, in turn, increases the difficulty for generalized 




In response, advertisers, increasingly, try to reach audiences not through messages but 
through continuous tracking of individuals, wherever they are online. The paradigm of this 
shift on the largest scale is not advertisers but Google which provides an infrastructure for the 
new advertisers based not on tracking customers in the traditional sense (customers who enter 
into a discrete monetary transaction for the supply of goods or services), but on tracking 
every online social process without limit and maximizing the percentage of social life that 
occurs online.  
 
It is as if the social itself were the new target of capitalism. This is not the first time that 
changes in business models, based in new technologies of mediated communication, have had 
far-reaching significance for social life. James Beniger thirty years ago in his book The 
Control Revolution gave a brilliant analysis of the emergence of mass markets through the 
coordinating power of electronic communications in 19th century North America and Europe. 
But what we are seeing today goes wider. We are witnessing the attempt through 
communication infrastructure to funnel all social action into a vast continuous space across 
which value can be generated seamlessly through the continuous generation of data. As Bruce 
Schneier put it bluntly, ‘the primary business model of the internet is built on mass 
surveillance’ (2013). So have we reflected sufficiently on the potential costs of this 
remodelling for social and political life, and particularly for democracy in its various forms?  
 
Getting along with surveillance 
 
When we watch a film about former East Germany such as The Lives of Others, we feel a 
compassion for the lead character, the lonely surveillance operative condemned to a life (of 
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watching the lives of others) that both he and we know is profoundly wrong. So how can a 
whole infrastructure of surveillance that was, in another context, so obviously wrong 
suddenly become right today?  
 
One explanation is that this surveillance does not appear to us as an end in itself. We are told 
that the benefits of data interpretation (that flow from that prior infrastructure of data 
collection) are transformative for the human race. Health is just one of many areas where 
individual submission to continuous external surveillance, based on an infrastructure of 
connection, is regarded as a clear benefit. The ‘Quantified Self’ movement has promoted 
such an understanding, using some interesting moves to make natural the claim that self-
surveillance (and the sharing of our personal data with the systems that incite and process that 
data) is somehow good for us.  
 
Behind this lie the commercial pressures not just from the specialised data industries but from 
the businesses that provide the interfaces across which data is collected and where social 
norms of ‘sharing’ data are inculcated. Without needing any social movement to champion 
them, social media platforms, such as Facebook, used by approximately 20% of the world’s 
entire population, have grown large on business models that assume the generation and sale 
of data through the continuous tracking of what individuals ‘do’ on those platforms. The 
normalization of surveillance (and not just self-surveillance) often comes with economic 
force: the interest of health insurance companies in subject’s self-tracking of their bodies is 
obvious, but it is just one entry-point.  
 
Meanwhile, we are encouraged in authoritative publications on Big Data published by 
influential actors such as the World Economic Forum, the OECD, McKinsey and PWC to 
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think that data is produced through the distinctive process of people giving consent to the 
collection of data about themselves and then later to its use for various purposes: after all, the 
Latin etymology of the term ‘data’ (‘that which has been given’) suggests that something has 
to, first, be given. But that is not how these powerful actors think about ‘data’. Instead they 
refer to it as something already there, a natural or social resource: like ‘oil’, ‘a new type of 
raw material that’s on a par with capital and labour’, or a ‘raw good’ (WEF 2011; United 
Nations 2012). To say metaphorically that data is ‘oil’ or ‘raw material’ is a sort of verbal 
magic that denies the social process through which data is produced. If data is just ‘out there’, 
ready to be taken, then problems about privacy and proper use still need attention, but merely 
as side-effects to be mitigated. But what if the continuous automated collection of data and 
the reorganising of social, economic and political life around  that process is already a key 
building-block of democracy: the notion of individual autonomy?  
 
We should not be surprised at such attempts to reimagine the social through data. There are 
historical precedents, at least in general terms. Karl Polanyi’s brilliant account of the social 
conflicts that surrounded early capitalism reminds us that major economic transformation 
always involves social engineering. In the late 18th and 19th centuries the issue was the shift 
from a subsistence economy based around family production within wider relations of 
domination to the creation of markets through which all ‘social relations are embedded in the 
economic system’ (2001: 60 [1944]). ‘The market’, in Polanyi’s view and contrary to Adam 
Smith, was not ‘natural’ but instead a social production. Or, as Polanyi put it more 
provocatively: markets require ‘the effect of highly artificial stimulants administered to the 
body social’ (2001: 60), stimulations that enable people to become accustomed to the 
governance of economic life across space through market signals. Exactly what Zuboff sees 
happening now: ‘the logic of accumulation produces its own social relations’ (2015: 77). The 
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social stimulation needed today is not of course to create networked markets – they have 
existed for 200 years or more – but to link every social activity into a datafied plane, a 
‘managed continuity’, from which value can be generated, and so new types of market 
transaction made possible. Through this new form of social engineering, we become part of, 
and subject to, market principles whether or not we plan to be engaged in economic activity, 
even in the ordinary course of social interaction.  
 
There are, in sum, today deep social and cultural pressures (themselves based in profound 
economic imperatives) that are encouraging large numbers of people across the planet to see 
as positive the embedding of continuous surveillance within everyday life, something that, for 
a long time, was not seen as positive, indeed as inimical to democracy itself. It is widely 
acknowledged that the Snowden revelations about the continuous intercepting by the NSA 
and GCHQ of the data streams of commercial internet companies such as Google raised 
fundamental questions about political liberty, as the political theorist Quentin Skinner noted: 
‘not merely by the fact that someone is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone 
has the power to do so should they choose leaves us at the mercy of arbitrary power. . . . what 
is offensive to liberty is the very existence of such arbitrary power’ (Skinner 2013). But if it 
was the existence of such power that contradicts liberty, then surely we should have been 
offended by the power already vested in the commercial surveillance infrastructure on which 
powerful states were merely piggy-backing. It is as if we do not see as arbitrary in corporate 
hands power that automatically seems arbitrary in the hands of the state.  
 




There is something wrong here, but it lies less at the level of conventional notions of liberty 
although they matter when, for example, informational institutions, such as Google, demand 
enhanced rights to commercial privacy, as it lies at the level of the broader value of 
individual autonomy that in many readings is intimately connected with the possibility of 
democracy. It was the strength, or example, of Hegel’s social theory to emphasise that (in the 
words of one of his leading interpreters) that freedom is ‘possible . . . only if one is also 
already in a certain (ultimately institutional, norm-governed) relations to others’ (Pippin 
2008: 4). Sometimes the practical form of such relations may be at odds with the norms that 
govern those relations, so that we start to feel ourselves  ‘part of a practice that has either 
gone dead . . . or requires of the agent further commitments incompatible with others 
necessary within some form of life’ (2008: 5). If so, those norms lose teir legitimacy, and (to 
quote another leading Hegel interpreter, Terry Pinkard) ‘the lives in a form of life become 
uninhabitable’ (2012: 118). Could this be the contradictory situation into which we are 
moving?  
  
At the heart of Hegel’s idea of autonomy is the idea of some space of autonomy where an 
individual can be in a reflective relation with herself. For Hegel, building on Kant, a free life 
needs to be a self-sufficient life in which (as Pippin puts it) ‘nothing from outside, nothing 
not-me, determines my actions’ (2008: 136). It is not that autonomy requires a life entirely 
free from constraints: on the contrary, an autonomous life involves, in large part, the reflexive 
adaptation to constraints. But at the core of autonomy instead is having in some sense an 
inner life, enjoying one’s own ‘right of subjectivity’ (Pippin 2008: 167): for this is the basis 
on which selves recognise others as having the same status as moral agents that they assume 
themselves to have. As Pippin notes, this need for recognition is not just something desirable: 
it underpins the very possibility of freedom. As Hegel himself put it, ‘freedom is this: to be 
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with oneself in the other’ (quoted Pippin 2008: 186). It is autonomy in just this sense, I 
suggest, that becomes harder to sustain under surveillance capitalism when business models 
depend on continuous automated surveillance to generate data from which profit can 
continuously be extracted.  
 
This might seem a rather abstract way of posing the problem of living under continuous 
corporate surveillance. But it has practical consequences. Hegel’s notion of autonomy has 
direct links forward (Wood 1990: 99), for example, to ‘the right to free development of [a 
person’s] personality’ in Article 2 of the German Basic Law which insists on the need of 
individuals to have a space in which they mature and grow as civic subjects, and sees this as 
the basis for any notion of democratic participation (Hornung and Schnabel 2009: 85). The 
‘right to personality’ has been incorporated also in the Marco Civil, the radical alterative 
governance framework for the internet proposed by the government of Brazil in response to 
the Snowden revelations. And it is the need to protect the right to personality from constant 
interference, rather than the conflict need to ‘free up’ the market opportunities for new data-
based business models that, in part, underlies proposed new data protection regulations in 
Europe.  
 
Specific Implications for Democracy 
 
What, you might ask, has this got to do with democracy as a form of practice?  
 
There are of course many practical forms and normative models of democracy. If the threat 
from continuous automated surveillance were a threat to functioning of just one model of 
democracy (say liberal or republican models), then the threat could be avoided, just by 
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adopting a different model. Robert dahls’ theory of polyarchy which attempts to model the 
structures underlying all democracy’s practical forms may help here, although some of its 
formulations are focussed on characterizing the resource structures that enable the discovery 
of political knowledge by individuals already assumed to be autonomous. But it is at last 
significant that Dahl’s whole model is based on what (1989: chapter 7) he calls ‘the 
presumption of personal autonomy’. We know, for sure, that some threats to personal 
autonomy (eg those that create terror and silence voice directly) are compatible with 
democratic expression. But today’s normalization of automated surveillance by corporate and 
state institutions is not a threat of that sort: its threat to democracy is more subtle.   
 
There is much that could be said about the increasingly ‘authoritarian’ nature of individual’s 
relations to information and computing systems and its potential long-term corrosive effect 
on the conditions of public life, as legal theorist Julie Cohen (2012) has done so much to 
highlight. Rather than focus on the public aspects of this authoritarianism, I want here to 
concentrate on the core of Cohen’s concerns which, as I read it, lies in the threat to the very 
space of the individual, as an autonomous individual. It is here that John Dewey’s theory of 
democracy as ‘a mode of conjoint communicated experience’ (Dewey 1993: 110) helps us by 
emphasising the grounding of democracy as a social form in communications that enable the 
‘pooling of the net results of the experiences of multitudes of people’ (Dewey 1993: 208). 
The point of such a social form, except in elite models of democracy, lies in what Dewey 
calls ‘some faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgement and action’ 
(Dewey 1993: 242). But why value such experience and its exchange unless it really is the 
distinct experience of autonomous individuals whose development together as individuals 
provides the point of democracy as a mechanism of sharing? A similar point arises with 
regard to Amartya Sen’s notion not of democracy, but even more fundamentally, human 
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development as a mode of social organization oriented to actualizing human being’s capacity 
to shape the environments in which they live. It only makes sense to organize things towards 
optimizing individuals’ ‘freedom to do the things one has reason to value’ (Sen 1999: 18) 
because human beings are the type of beings who evolve reasons based on values formed in 
the course of their and others’ experience as autonomous individuals.  
 
But the spaces of individual autonomy and of social interaction today increasingly have 
installed within them data-driven processes which are continuously tracking, categorizing, 
and re-presenting those spaces and what goes on within them back to social actors in forms 
which are very different from the terms in which humans themselves deliberate and act. An 
aggregating, calculative logic is taking social reality apart and reconstituting it in ways that 
rework the space of individual autonomy from an external perspective, driven by forms of 
maximalization (for example of corporate data value) which bear little relation to the sorts of 
goal that motivate individual experience or action. Today’s ‘computed sociality’ (Alaimo and 
Kallinikos 2017) no longer therefore provides the secure starting-point of arguments for the 
value of democracy that previous forms of social experience once did. We are already seeing 
one version of this unsettling in recent debates about ‘fake news’ in the US 2016 Presidential 
election, when the ‘reasonable’ operation of algorithmic logics generated outcomes – in the 
form of false claims circulating with the weight of accepted fact – that undermine one key 
goal of interaction in a democracy, the obtaining of factual information that is useful for 
deliberation.  
 
The result of this transformation will not be to destabilize democratic systems as such: we 
know indeed that political parties of certain sorts can function well in an ecology of lies or 
unstable ‘truths’, even if parties that seek genuinely to transform social conditions will have 
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more difficulty, since such transformations are impossible without the orientating reference-
point of factual information.  Nor will the result be the impossibility of political participation 
(or at least the sensation of it), since the illusion of participation is easily compatible with the 
circulation of algorithmically inflected representations, indeed that illusion may even be 
stimulated by certain algorithmic feedback loops. What is  destabilized more fundamentally 
by the normalization of continuous automated corporate surveillance of individuals is the 
point of democracy, the basic normative reference-point which orientates the practice of 
democracy itself: that is, the attempt to organize social and institutional life on the basis that 
the voices of individuals, and their accounts of the lives they have lived as autonomous 
individuals, actually matter, and matter because voice, and the recognition of voice, is a 
fundamental process of which humans are capable (Couldry 2010 chapter 5). Once the 
normative moorings of democracy as an idea have become loosened by the normalization of 
external surveillance as the condition of individual life, then we have considerably more 
reason to fear those who say that democracy was never worth striving for in the beginning.  
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